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THE LAST BUTSKELLITE
John D. Ayer*
Acrs OF HOPE: CREATING AuTHoRrrY IN LrMERATuRE, LAW,
AND POLITICS. By James B. White. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press. 1994. Pp. xv, 322. $27.50.
I would rather prove my self to be a Gentleman,
by being learned and humble, valiant and inoffensive,
vertuous, and communicable,
than by a fond ostentation of riches
Izaak Walton1
In the comedy revue "Beyond the Fringe," Jonathan Miller puzzled over the sign that used to appear in railway restrooms: "gentlemen lift the seat."'2 Is it descriptive, in the sense that lifting the
seat is a condition, perhaps a necessary condition, of the state of
being a gentleman? Or is it normative, in the sense that a gentleman should lift the seat, whether he does so in fact or not?3 Or is
it injunctive-celebratory, in the sense of "gentlemen, start your engines," or perhaps "God save the queen"?
Miller's durable sendup, like most good comedy, presaged
something larger about the society that brought it to birth. Miller
bespoke and encouraged - it is always hard to disentangle threads
like these - a critical shift in self-consciousness in the British upper middle class. Others might want to call it the rise of Thatcherism in recognition of the in-your-face, grocer's-daughter
conservatism that held sway in Britain through most of the 1980s. I
would rather call it the decline of the Butskellites. You remember
the Butskellites: the allies and followers of "Rab" Butler, Conservative, and Hugh Gaitskell, Labour, the two greatest "Prime
Ministers" Britain never had who shaped and defined so much of
the first generation of postwar Britain - the years, shall we say,
between the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II in 1953 and the in-

* Professor of Law, University of California at Davis. A.B. 1963, J.D. 1968, Louisville;
LL.M. 1969, Yale. - Ed. Thanks to Joel Dobris for his helpful comments.
1. IZAAK WALTON, TIE COMPLEAT ANGLER (PART I) i, 13 (n.p., 1653), reprinted in 6

THm OxFoRD ENOLISH DICIONARY 452 (2d ed. 1989) (illustrating the third definition of a
gentleman: "A man in whom gentle birth is accompanied by appropriate qualities and behavior; hence, in general, a man of chivalrous instincts and fine feelings.").
2. See generally RONALD BERGAN, BEYOND THE FmIoGE... AND BEYOND (1989).
3. Another possibility is that it is an invitation to petty larceny - unless the Defense

Department purchased the seat, in which case it might be an invitation to grand larceny, or
perhaps treason.
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vestiture of Prince Charles in 1969. The Butskellites represented a
cozy, meliorist, reassuring sort of centrism when the female royals
still slept with their own husbands and the family doctor down at
the National Health Service surgery was definitely "in."
James Boyd White, Professor of Law and English and Adjunct
Professor of Classics at the University of Michigan, is a gentleman
and a Butskellite - perhaps the last Butskellite. In his books and
essays, White does not use the word "gentleman" unduly. This is,
however, only proper. A gentleman certainly should not call attention to himself, and preaching about gentlemanliness would be vulgar and self-defeating. Still, White's credentials are impeccable.
Being born an American is no disability, of course, certainly not if
you went to Groton, that most British of American private schools,
as White did. Groton, as White himself candidly recalls, "had been
founded in the nineteenth century on the model of the English public schools with the aim of recreating in America something of the
ideal of the English gentleman. In a rather sentimental way it idealized England, Episcopalian Christianity, genteel country life, and
high culture.... -14 From Groton White went on to Amherst College, where he was told that "[c]onduct befitting a gentleman is expected at all times .... -5 From Amherst he proceeded to the
Harvard Law School, where he served as an editor of the law review - in the company of Stephen Breyer, now a Justice of the
Supreme Court. But one gets the sense - though White himself
might well contest the point - that Harvard was something of an
afterthought: the qualities and even the skills that give him his
character seem to have been shaped before he went there.
White is not a gentleman merely by education, however. For
more than a quarter century, he has occupied himself with the most
gentlemanly of activities, the professing of law in the grand style.
Law certifies him for a place in the American aristocracy, though
it surely would not do so in the British aristocracy; his crossappointment in the Department of English secures his claim to seriousness on matters of morals and aesthetics. Whatever White's reticence about his own gentlemanly qualities, it is fair to say that he
has made it his mission to try to instruct in the ways of a gentleman,
and thus to confront, and often also to ponder, the pedagogic mys4. JAMEs B. WnrrE, Tins BOOK OF STARREs: LEAu.NINo To READ GEORGE HERBERT 4
(1994) [hereinafter STARR s].

5. The Amherst College Bulletin Catalogue Issue for 1958-59 provides, "Conduct befitting a gentleman is expected at all times of students at Amherst College. It is assumed that
undergraduates will understand what constitutes gentlemanly conduct without specific regulations forbidding particular actions." AMHERsT COLLEoE BuLLEMN, CATALOGUE ISSUE 3334 (1958-59), reprintedin JAMES B. WHrrE, THE LEOAL IMAGINATION 513 (1973) [hereinafter LEGAL IMAGINATION]. The quote in Legal Imagination is conclusive proof that White
read the catalog.
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teries that underlie this curious practice. Acts of Hope: Creating
Authority in Literature,Law, and Politics embodies the most recent
product of this long inquiry and is welcome by anyone who has enjoyed or been instructed by his previous ventures.
Hope is White's sixth book, or seventh, depending on when you
count his other book published at the same time, This Book of StarreS. 6 White began his career with The Legal Imagination,7 which is
nominally a coursebook, but, in terms of conventional genre boundaries, it is surely one of the most original and unexpected
coursebooks ever to appear. In truth, Legal Imagination had its
provenance, as I will try to show hereafter, but this fact does nothing to lessen its merit. Next came Constitutional Criminal Procedure,8 another coursebook - perhaps slightly more conventional
which was a joint product of White and his former student James
Scarboro. There is every reason to believe that Scarboro, who has
since left academia for a distinguished career at the bar, was a full
partner in the enterprise, but the project bears many earmarks including the quirks - of White's distinctive style.
After Criminal Procedure there was a gap of sorts in White's
writing. White published some articles in respectable journals, but
he generated nothing like the torrential outpouring seemingly so
typical of his colleagues at the University of Chicago. He seemed
to stand as something of an outsider, almost a curiosity, in the dramatic arena of law scholarship. In 1984 White published his first
"real" book - When Words Lose Their Meaning.9 Students of
Legal Imagination could recognize it as the narrative substructure
of that coursebook - a kind of a pony or teacher's manual for the
earlier work. Words got respectable and generally favorable recognition in the academic press.1 0 Other scholars, meanwhile, seemed
to catch up with White. The trope of examining "legal" materials
on the model, or with the devices, of "literary" studies appeared to
gain currency, and White seemed to find himself, perhaps to his
surprise, at the head of a small parade." Perhaps his new notoriety
spurred him on; new work seemed to come forth in somewhat
6. STARRs,supra note 4.

7.

LEGAL IMAGINATION,

supra note 5.

8. JAMES E. SCARBORO & JAMES B. WnrE, CONSiTrUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
(1977) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL].

9. JAmEs B. WHmTE, WHEN WORDs LOSE THEIR MEANING (1984) [hereinafter WoRDs].

10. I reviewed it myself in John D. Ayer, Law, Literatureand the "Conversation of Mankind," 4 CARDozo ARTs & ENTERTAINMENT L. L 261 (1985).
11. See Symposium, Legal Storytelling,87 MIcH. L. REv. 2073 (1989); Robert M. Cover,
The Supreme Court, 1982 Term - Foreword:L Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REv. 4
(1983); Gerald P. L6pez, Lay Lawyering, 32 U.C.LA. L. Rv. 1 (1984); Robin West, Jurisprudence as Narrative: An Aesthetic Analysis of Modern Legal Theory, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv.
145 (1985).
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quicker succession. Heracles' Bow12 appeared in 1985; then Justice
as Translationl3 appeared in 1990. By this time, White had achieved
a modest eminence; he spoke at a plenary session of the Association of American Law Schools' convention in New Orleans in 1989.
Now, he has written Hope and Starres.
Although it may not always have been apparent to his readers,
White had a fairly clear notion of what he was trying to do from the
start and of how he was trying to do it. In the introduction to Legal
Imagination, he said: "[A]nyone who knows Theodore Baird of
Amherst College will instantly see that this book is the direct result
of his teaching, full of his ideas and imitative of his style; and to
such a one, nothing here that may please or instruct will be new or
unfamiliar."4
one of those remarkable academic figures who exist
Baird .is
more often in folklore than in biography. Although he seems not to
have published frequently, he passes into legend as the friend of
writers as various as James Merrill and Scott Turow and as the proponent and exemplar of a particular kind of teaching. Particularly
at this late a date, it is probably impossible for an outsider to capture precisely what Baird proposed. We do, however, have some
fragmentary shards of evidence. William H. Pritchard, himself once
a student and later a professor of English at Amherst, has written of
his own experience as a student in a course that Baird inspired. It
was the required first-year composition course: "[It was] a brilliantly original approach to writing as an activity. That activity, performed by us three times each week - in short responses to
difficult, sometimes impossible questions about thinking, meaning,
knowing, and other essential human pastimes - was my introduction to serious intellectual inquiry."' 5
In Starres, White apparently speaks of the same course - a
course, as he says, "that shaped much of the life of the college; we
learned that in our writing we spoke in voices that defined us, and
12. JAMES B. WrrE, HERACLES' Bow (1985) [hereinafter HERACLEs' Bow].
13. JAMES B. 'WHrm, JUSTICE As TRANSLATION (1990) [hereinafter JusTICE].

14. LEGAL IMAGNATION, supranote 5, at xxvi. White also acknowledges Baird in HERACLES' Bow, supra note 12, at xvii. This reference reminds me of a particular aspect of
White's study of relationships: his search for the right relationship between the teacher and
the student. Anyone who has ever tried his hand at teaching knows that there are a number
of ways to encounter students, most of them wrong. You can bully them. You can mesmerize
them. You can kowtow to them. You can set them apart in a posture of ironic detachment.
Or you can strike out - as White was apparently taught to strike out - to find some plane
on which you can engage them, not as equals in knowledge or experience perhaps, but as
equals in claim to respect and in responsibility to the truth and as participants in a great
adventure.
15. William H. Prichard, Ear Training, in TEACmNo WHAT WE Do: EssAYs BY AMHERST COLLEGE FACULTY 127 (1991). For an account of a course based on Baird's, see
WIiAM E. COLES, JR., CoMposiNG: WarnNG AS A SELt-CREAUNG PROCESS (1983).
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our readers, and the relation between us. Writing is the creation of
a self, as one of the teachers put it . .16
Writing is the creation of a self. The phrase is pivotal. You almost might be tempted to say that he is engaged in "the teaching of
ethics." But this phrase is slippery at best, and I suspect'White himself would avoid it, for reasons that a moment's reflection will make
manifest. Any law teacher with the most elementary sense of history will recall the transports of anxiety that accompanied teaching
ethics over the past generation. Its potted history is easily retold; in
the undertow of the Watergate scandal, someone noticed that an
inordinate number of the malefactors' held law degrees. Law
professors had failed the public, so went the standard litany, by
propagating such a generation of knaves and scoundrels, and we
were enjoined to "put our house right." Responding with a kind of
panicky alacrity, the legal education establishment started slapping
"ethics" requirements on just about everything: the law curriculum,
the bar exam, the continuing education agenda, and so forth. A few
voices protested that this was all a futility or worse, but they went
mostly unheard. Granted, there are some things a lawyer is not
supposed to do that a layman might not intuitively realize - for
example, lawyers should not commingle funds. Therefore, instruction in ethics on these more obscure issues might be worthwhile.
But you do not "learn" ethics the way you "learn" other subjects
like Spanish. You may say, "I'm going to Madrid next summer; I'd
better brush up on the pluperfect," but you do not say, "I'm going
to face a difficult ethical decision next fall; I'd better brush up on
the categorical imperative."
Quite the contrary, most people know perfectly well, even without a legal education, that they have no right to steal a red hot stove
just because it does not happen to be nailed down. As for the effect
of teaching and learning - well, you could start with the example
of Strepsiades in Aristophanes's comedy The Clouds,17 who went to
Socrates's thinking-school so the great master-could teach him how
to evade his creditors. For a modem instance, one could cite Myron
Scholes and Mark Wolfson's remarkable textbook, Taxes and Business Strategy.'8 A reviewer has remarked that this is the sort of
book "that defines a discipline for students who are not practitioners."'19 Scholes is one of that small group of the elect whose names
16. STARRYs, supra note 4, at 20.
17. AmsToPHAINrs, CLOUDS, WOMEN IN PowER, KNiGHTs 14 (Kenneth McLeish trans.,

1979).
18. MYRON S. Scioi..ns & MARK A. WOLSoN, TAxEs AND BusniMss STRATEGY
PLArn.io APPROACH (1992).

19. John E. Karayan, Book Review, 24 J. INmT. Bus. STUD. 602 (1993).

A
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are regularly mentioned as candidates for the Nobel prize in economics. Yet, as the authors of another review commented:
Scholes and Wolfson bring to the venture a spirit that, at least in academic publications, is unique as far as we are aware. They bring a
sophisticated, almost completely unadulterated, private optimizing focus to bear on the existing provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.
There is an objective function to be maximized, there are parameters,
and there are constraints. To arrive at a constrained maximum, you
push a constraint until it binds. In this world, the tax rules are just the
principal constraints, restrictions on the maximization of private
wealth, to be pushed until they bind. It is an approach to taxation
that can make for edifying reading, especially at the hands of two
economists as astute (and as fascinated by tax rules) as these. It
brings to tax planning a sophisticated economic
perspective that could
be matched by few (if any) practitioners. 20
Or to put it more precisely: we will not tell you anything that will
send you to Leavenworth, but we are eight thousand times brighter
than those pinheads down at the Internal Revenue Service, and we
see no reason why you should be bound by their limitations. Or as
a colleague of mine complained, on a particularly grey afternoon in
the faculty lounge, "Now I know how Dr. Frankenstein felt when he
heard the rumbling basement."
Teaching, in any ordinary sense, simply cannot avoid this problem. We teach ethics because we cannot do otherwise. The student
learns ethics from the teacher the same way he learns them any
place else: through a patchwork of fears, loyalties, attachments,
and betrayals. Apt is the example of the lady named Wilde,
Who kept herself quite undefiled
By thinking of Jesus
And loathsome diseases
And the bother of having a child.
As to the great spasm of legal ethics education, there is no conclusive evidence that it has done any permanent harm. But it would
be a brave soul who would argue that lawyers are more ethical today than they were a quarter-century ago. Moreover, a cynic might
argue that all our fuss and bother about ethics has had no more
consequence than the public conversion of a former savings and
loan executive as he tries to leverage his way out of a halfway house
and into a community service program.
Against this tendency, there are a small number of law scholars
who have sought to confront directly the perplexities of ethics
teaching. They work in diverse ways, and it is possible that they
would not enjoy seeing their names in the same paragraph. I am
thinking of Tom Shaffer, who combines his somewhat hard-edged
20. Theodore S. Sims & Emil M. Sunley, Book Review, 45 NATL. TAX J. 451,452 (1992).
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Christianity with surprising hopefulness, 2 1 Howard Lesnick, who
combines the texture of rabbinical wisdom with a more radical
agenda for change,2 2 and Anthony Kronman, who has put the per23
son of the lawyer at the center of his scholarly agenda.
One would also have to include White, for whom the purpose of
this "training" is not merely to teach writing as an instrument for
communication, but to introduce the student to a way of life. This
way of life does not counsel isolation, but rather trying to establish
the proper relation between the self and the world, the right mix of
sympathy and self-respect. Taken in this context, there are two
characteristics that distinguish White's work from other scholars exanining the teaching of ethics. One is a particular kind of
"slow
24
reading" of literary texts. The other is the device of reading both
"literary" texts, for example, a Jane Austen novel, and "legal" documents side by side, seeking to apply the same tools of analysis to
both. Slow reading of legal documents is, or at least was, unexpected, and the juxtaposition adds freshness to the nonlegal work as
well.
Neither slow reading nor juxtaposing legal texts seems quite so
foreign to the discourse of legal scholarship today as it would have
twenty years ago - White's presence itself surely is a factor in their
increasing familiarity. You could say that slow reading, for example, is the very essence of law schooling, though it is hard to show
that lawyers traditionally do it the same way the literary people do.
As to reading both literary and legal texts alike - well, Northrop
Frye has shown us how we base our literary tastes in the conventions of genre. 25 In addition, Clifford Geertz has shown us how
genres become "blurred, '2 6 and a hundred more abstruse theorists
have dissected this insight, classified it, and dressed it up in jargon.
Thus it is probably no longer provocative - though it may still be
instructive - to recognize Marx's Kapital, for example, or Weber's
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism as great nineteenth21. See most recently THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, LAWYERS, CLIENTS
AND MORAL RESPONSIBILTY (1994), and, more generally, John D. Ayer, Narrative in the

Moral Theology of Thomas Shaffer, 40 J. LEGAL ED. 173-94 (1990) (book review).
22. See HOwARD LESNICK, BEING A LAWYER (1992); cf. ELiZABEH DVORKIN, JACK
HIMMELSTEIN & HowARD LESNICK, BECOMING A LAWYER (1981).

23. ANTHONY KROMAN,THE LOST LAWYER (1993).
24. The phrase is from Starres, in which White introduces it as an artifact of the Amherst
tradition, but it seems equally applicable here. STARRES, supra note 4, at 19-20; cf.EDUCATION AT AMHERST 241-43, 321-23 (Gall Kennedy ed., 1955); TEACmuNG WHAT WE Do: ESSAYS BY THE AMi-mRST COLLEGE FACULTY 1-11, 127-43 (1991).
25. See, eg., C. NORTHROP FRYE, ANATOMY OF CRTICISM 243-337 (1957).
26. See Clifford Geertz, Blurred Genres: The Refiguration of Social Thought, in LOCAL
KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETATIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 19-35 (1983).
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century imaginative works, justifying comparison with, say, Mid-

dlemarch or War and Peace.2 7
At least one important metaphysical presupposition underlies
White's work. White belongs to the group that says we use language not merely to describe but also to define our world - and
this notion, too, probably sounds less alien twenty years after he
first made it.28 Important also is the fact that for White this process
of definition, like language itself, ig a collaborative process. White
is nothing if not sociable in his disposition; he seems to take particular pleasure in writing generous acknowledgments to friends and
supporters. 2 9 But he knows we are not mere creatures of others.
Rather, he understands as well as anyone that a person defines a
life, or constitutes a self, in a ceaseless dialog between self and
world. These ideas come together in a fully articulated notion of
friendship - the kind of friendship in which friends educate each
other and tell each other when they are being fools and should stop.
In a related perspective, White understands the close and complex
relationship between law and social practice, exemplified by Andy
Capp's dictum that the only difference between law and custom is
that it takes a lot more courage to break a custom.
White's most notable contributions to the technique of reading
seem to be two: first, an insistent stress on the refractory richness
of language, and, second, a literary person's eye for form and the
art of form. The first point - linguistic richness - is one you
would think should be obvious to a lawyer, and heaven knows we
spend time enough trying to tease our students into a kind of sophistication about words. But White's essays are an awkward reminder that most of us are not very good at this kind of subtlety or perhaps more precisely that we give up too early and retreat to
27. For free reading during my first year of law school, I made my way through John Dos
Passos's great trilogy, U.S.A. Late in the year, nearing the end of my contracts book - I
believe it was smack in the middle of Corn Exchange v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434 (1943) - it
struck me that both U.S.A. and the contracts book offered the same textured weaving and
reweaving of experience. Years later I read, more or less simultaneously, Claude LAviStrauss's Triste Tropiques and Gabriel Garcia Marquez's One Hundred Years of Solitude the one teasing fantasy by pretending to be fact, the other affronting fact with what must
have been fantasy, and to this day I have to stop and think just which was which. For his
novel Hopscotch, the Latin American writer Julio Cortazar invites the reader to proceed by
at least two different sequences; law professors do the same. Juuo CORTAZAR, HOPSCOTCH
(1966).
28. White acknowledges his debt to the technical literature of "performative" speech in
WoRDs, supra note 9, at 290-91.
29. Particularly remarkable in this uncertain time is the seeming durability of his affections. The names of Arthur Adkins, L.H. LaRue, Theodore Eisele, Joseph Vining, and Mary
White all appear among the acknowledgments in Hope (p. xv), and all have appeared in
acknowledgments at least twice before. See WoRDs, supranote 9, at xv and HERACLES Bow,
supra note 12, at xvii. In all of White's acknowledgments, many names appear more than
once. The practice goes further Heraclesis dedicated to LaRue; Words to "Mary" (White?)
and Hope to "The Monday Night Group."
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some functional "single meaning" that seems to meet the needs of
the institution, or at least of the bar review outline.
White's second contribution - the potentialities of form - is,
to coin a favorite White term, more problematic. To his credit,
White shows a kind of bravura skill in demonstrating how the form
of a work may serve to amplify, criticize, or question the very work
that it seems to embody. The trouble is, however, that this tactic
seems to operate best on works we knew were "literary" all along
it fails most conspicuously on those texts most conventionally
legal. If I am correct on this point, then the necessary inference is
that White fails at precisely the point where he would most like to
succeed - at unifying legal and literary writing.
Readers of White's prior work will recognize a lot of this framework in Hope - worked out in an exposition that is perhaps a bit
more familiar than one might wish. As in the earlier books, White
offers a set of loosely connected essays on texts, some legal, most
not. The canonical this time include, for example, Plato's Crito (pp.
3-44); Jane Austen's Mansfield Park (pp. 187-223), and Emily Dickinson's poetry (pp. 224-71). Only one instance clearly exemplifies
the legal: PlannedParenthoodv. Casey30 (pp. 153-83). Hale's Consideration Touching the Amendment or Alteration of Lawes (pp.
124-52), surely counts as a legal document in some sense, but it is
not part of any conventional law school curriculum; this is also true
of Hooker's Preface to the Lawes of EcclesiasticalPolitie (pp. 82123). The remaining penumbral items include Lincoln's Second Inaugural (pp. 294-302) and a speech from the dock by Nelson
Mandela (pp. 279-94).
The nominal subject matter of the book is "authority" - how
texts "assert, or deny, that a person should submit to... authority. . . ." (p. xi). Presumably this distinguishes it from Words, in
which White examines the claims we make for the meaning of
words and the failure or disintegration thereof; Translation, in
which the subject is, well, translation; and even Heracles, in which
White examines the perhaps somewhat broader subject of "rhetoric." But not a lot rides on the distinction of substance. Whole
chapters could be plucked out and dropped into one or another of
the earlier works, and the careless reader might well not notice.
The unifying force of White's strategy seems far more obvious than
any distinctiveness of content.
In form also, there are similarities to White's earlier work, particularly Words and Legal Imagination. Both Words and Hope are
more or less discontinuous essays, threaded loosely on a common
strand. Each includes a text from Plato and another from Jane Aus30. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
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ten. Each text is intelligible in the larger context: the ambiguity of
community is surely one of the defining tropes of classical Athens,
and Jane Austen surely represents the novelist of friendship par excellence. In the table of contents, Hope speaks of "Creating a Pub31
lic World" (p. vii); Words speaks of "Making a Public World.1
Each speaks of the "Self" - Hope refers to "The Claims of the
World on the Self, the Self on the World" (pp. 3-44), "the Authority
of the Self" (pp. 187-271), and "Reconstituting Self and World"
(pp. 275-305); Words speaks of "The Reconstitution of Language
and Self in a Community of Two. '' 32 Comparisons with Heracles
and Translation are not quite so insistent, but, in both those books,
as in Words and Hope, White essays the device of treating a judicial
opinion like a literary text.
Indeed, there is evidence that the roots of White's approach in
Hope go back to his earliest works. Hope contains an instructive
juxtaposition of Shakespeare's Richard II and Richard Hooker's
is
Preface to the Lawes of EcclesiasticalPolitie (pp. 47-123). There 33
an extensive excerpt from Hooker's Preface in Legal Imagination,
and a brief, but suggestive, discussion of Richard H"in the same
book.34 Legal Imagination also gives an important role to Jane
Austen, particularly Prideand Prejudice.3 5 The Hooker selection is
perhaps somewhat recherche; Sir Matthew Hale's Considerations
Touching the Amendment or Alteration of the Lawes, discussed at
length in Hope is, by White's own acknowledgment, "not widely
available" (p. 131) - one might call it "downright obscure" as it
was published only once, in 1787. But it appears to have been on
it provides the epiWhite's mind nearly twenty years ago, because
36
graph to Constitutional CriminalProcedure.
31. WoRDs, supra note 9, at vii. White seems to have a near-fatal weakness for the gerund: on Hope's Contents page alone, we have "creating," "imagining," "constituting," "makig," "transforming" "reconstituting" and "giving" (p. vii). I suppose a Jakobsonian critic
could instruct us on whether and to what extent this affection marks White as a "nominal" as
distinct from a "verbal" person, and the implications of such a distinction. Perhaps happily
for both of us, I am not cut out for the job.
32. WoRws, supra note 9, at vii.
33. LEGAL IMAGINATON, supra note 5,at 670-81.
34. 1d. at 817.
35. Id. at 401-07, 866, 872-73. He also gives some attention to Austen's Mansfield Park.
Id. at 249-51. White may have noticed that he has pretty much played his hand on Jane
Austen novels. The remainder - Persuasion, NorthangerAbbey, and Sense and Sensibility
- have their charms, but fairly common consent classes them as lesser works. Of course, it is
well within the rules for a literary academic to discover powers hitherto unsuspected in a
"minor" work.
36. "It is most certain, that time and long experience is much more ingenious subtle and
judicious, than all the wisest and acutest wits in the world coexisting can be." COrSTrruTIoNAL, supranote 8, at xv (quoting Sir Matthew Hale, ConsiderationsTouching the Amendment or Alteration of Lawes, in 1 A COLLETON OF TRAcTs RELATIVE TO THE LAW OF
ENGLAND 244, 254 (Francis Hargrave ed., Dublin 1787)). For Hope's exegesis on the text,
see p. 135.
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You can see most or all of White's distinctive strategy exemplified in Hope. For a literary person imbued in the culture of the law,
White's inclusion of Richard II (pp. 47-81) - Shakespeare's great
play about the poet-king, more poet than king, who crumbles under
the force of his more purposeful competitor - is a happy choice of
text. My own first exposure to RichardIIwas hearing John Gielgud
read selections on a wonderful old 33 1/3 record that I found in a
quirky little book-and-record shop in, of all places, suburban Cleveland. I thrilled at Gielgud's reading, and I admired the eponymous
hero - it was with a certain educative chagrin that I finally read
the play and came to see how much the hero was indeed the author
of his own undoing. White does an elegant job of showing that
Shakespeare's sympathies are, if anywhere, not with King Richard
or with Bolingbroke the rebel, but rather with the fact of tension
itself - the "position of increased responsibility and decreased certainty" (p. 79), where Shakespeare leaves us, and where, perhaps,
we are doomed to subsist.
White's treatment of the Crito is somewhat more unexpected
(pp. 3-43). I confess I had not thought highly of this dialog before,
having read it first in an elementary Greek class because it is short
enough and straightforward enough to serve as a vehicle - a pilot
vessel, or sometimes, I suppose, just a tugboat - for the transition
from the sureties of grammar and syntax to the uncharted seas of
literature. Imagine my surprise when I find that there is more to it
than that: that the character Crito's simplistic urgency has an art all
his own, and that the dialog operates with full Platonic - or is it
Whiteian? - sleight of hand, at once an example and a criticism of
its doctrinal premise. In his discussion of Richard, White uses the
technique of dramatic tension to exemplify a world of dramatic tension; here he uses a dialog on authority to assert the authority of
dialog.
With Mansfield Park, the results of White's analytical enterprise
are less surprising (pp. 187-223). The problem here is that Mansfield Park is a novel full of good material built around a heroine
whom no one can like very much - or, more precisely, whom the
author liked altogether too much, letting her authorial critical facilities lapse in the process. 37 White concedes that Fanny is not a success but argues that we can learn from her predicament in any
event. That is true, but not so original as some of White's other
points in Hope.
37. The distinction is not just a trifle. Of Emma, Jane Austen said she had created a
heroine whom no one would like but herself. Lionel Trilling, Emma and the Legend of Jane
Austen, in JANE AumSTN, EMMA: A CASEBOOK 118, 122 (David Lodge ed., 1968). That is
true in its way, but Austen's affection for Emma is far more detached and critical - and
therefore productive - than anything she did with Fanny in Mansfield Park
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White's choice of Emily Dickinson may seem odd at first blush,
but it need not be.so. It is customary to think of Dickinson as the
most private of poets, while White is ultimately a social being. Yet,
as White shows, Dickinson's art is not just her expression of her
private self. It is also the struggle to define her private self inside a
set of constraints to which she will not yield but from which she
cannot - and does not really want to - escape. Indeed, in his
introduction to Dickinson, White offers about the most explicit account I have seen anywhere of his own point of departure:
Whenever we speak, those who listen to us have expectations as to
how we shall do so.... In becoming competent at our languages, each
of us must find a way, actually a set of ways, to address the expectations that are in some sense the most important material with which
we work.
Sometimes, of course, there is no problem: there are moves in our
discourse that seem adequate to the occasion on which we wish to use
them.... But if all of ottr talk were of this kind it would be nothing
but reiterated cliche .... Instead, in the course of life we find ourselves again and again confronting the inadequacy of our language,
both on small and large occasions....
Dickinson faced the question whether her expressions would
count as poetry, and be taken seriously as such, or whether they
would be classified some other way - and since they obviously aspired to be poetry, not prose or some other established form, this
would mean their being entirely erased." [pp. 224-25]
This is good as a characterization of Dickinson,38 but even better as
a characterization of White and what it is that White tries to do.
That leaves the more obviously legal materials. Here, as I suggested above, 39 the appropriate response seems more complicated.
The keystone of White's argument may be his presentation of
Planned Parenthood v. Casey,40 which appears about midway
through the book (pp. 153-83). In this discussion we see the customary White technique, trying to understand the work not just in
its surface message but in its structure approached as a way of doing
business. Casey is certainly a good example, both in substance and
structure, as the Court attempts to understand abortion in terms of
its own somewhat messy doctrinal history. Recognizing - indeed
stressing - this context, White's admiration for Casey is great.
"This is not a reluctant or joyless opinion," he declares (p. 170).
Rather, it is an opinion in which the Court "commits itself to a vision of law as a process of culture that works against time" (p. 179).
38. The agonizing struggle between self and form is surely not a uniquely American phenomenon, but it is not uniquely Dickinsonian either, and it does seem to recur in other important American instances. Think of Wallace Stevens, for one, or Charles Ives, both in their
separate ways besotted with their heritage and in conffict with it.
39. See supra text accompanying note 30.
40. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992).
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Perhaps White's contention about the Casey opinion is true, but
White quotes a critic - apparently Robin West - as reminding
him that "none of this amounts to a hill of beans if one is of the
opinion that a fetus is a human life and abortion is murder." 41
White, in defense, suggests that he is not really arguing the abortion
issue per se - he understands our differences on that issue are vast.
Rather, he says, he is trying "to reach a shared view of the way in
which we can hope these differences can be lived with and addressed" (p. 182).
Can this be right? For myself, I reserve judgment. Independent
of whatever clues he may offer here, I know nothing about White's
view on abortion, but I doubt very much that he could have written
this essay if he believed that abortion is child murder. White is trying to establish common ground for people with irreconcilable
views. It may be the very irreconcilability that puts them beyond
common ground, however, in which case White's very invitation
may be an invitation to a corrupt compromise. 42 Perhaps the point
is that this kind of education takes time, and it will be twenty or
fifty or one hundred years before we can agree on whether Casey
performed the obligation that White assigns to it, or whether it is
just another cynical manipulation of the symbols of power.
White's final chapter on Mandela and Lincoln seems not entirely successful. Since Edmund Wilson's appreciation of Lincoln in
Patriotic Gore,43 it has been acceptable to recognize Lincoln as a
great literary and perhaps even poetic sensibility, now duly memorialized in his own volume of the Library of America.4 White's ear
for the Second Inaugural is alert and receptive, but his reading does
not really offer any surprises. 45 With Mandela, assuming White has
made the best possible case, I would have to conclude that the poetry remains in the life, not the work. Mandela is in a sense the
ideal White hero: dignified and reflective, insistent on forming and
expressing his own purposes, even in the shadow of the gallows.
The mere presence of Mandela on the planet is a mitzvah - the
Hebrew word for good act. Of course, it is also evidence, if we
need any more, that the white world owes more debt to mercy than
41. P. 182; see also p. xv.
42. Robert Cover's discussion of the posture of the abolitionists before the Civil War
provides a constructive comparison: for some, a system that supported slavery was itself so
corrupt that even to recognize it was to share in its corruption. ROBERT COVER, JusrIcE
ACCUSED 217-25 (1975).
43. EDMUND WILSON, PATRioTic GoRE 99-130 (1962).
44. See volumes 45 and 46 of the Library of America, ABRAHAM LINcOLN, SPEEC Es
AND Wi'rIINGs 1832-58 (1989) and ABRAHAM LINCOLN, SPEECHES AND WRIrNGs 1859-65

(1989).
45. Aside from Wilson, White had another extremely tough act to follow here. See
GARRY WILus,LINCOLN AT GETrYSBURO (1992).
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to justice for its comfort and convenience. The mere presence of
Lincoln was a mitzvah, too, but it is not clear, nor indeed is it necessary, that the blessings be the same.
This leaves White's comparison of Hale and Hooker. When we
consider these essays, we can observe an odd sort of reversal. I said
before that there was a certain familiarity about White's work, both
in form and content. Yet, in an important way, White's very consistency becomes - that word again - problematic. White may have
stayed the same in important respects over a quarter century. But
the world has not. Indeed White is, in one of many possible senses
of the term, a deeply conservative writer: conservative not merely
in his habits, but in his affections, committed perhaps most of all to
the reception and transmission of an inheritance.
White's comparison of Hale and Hooker demonstrates his fear
of radicalism and his respect for tolerance. Hale and Hooker are
not really "contemporaries" of each other - Hooker died in 1600,
Hale was born in 1609. But Hooker's work came into focus in large
measure through an appreciative biography, written by Izaak Walton, published in 1665, so in a functional sense, they are closer contemporaries than you might at first guess. 46 From the standpoint of
the reader, then, both addressed the same task: how to come to
terms with the near-apocalyptic power and force of the English
revolution, broadly defined. What White admires about them both
is their effort to bridge the gulfs of recrimination and incomprehension that threatened to tear English society apart. What he appreciates, of course, is their concern to find a strategy for reconciliation
through language. Indeed it is more than just appreciation; White
is trying to exemplify precisely those virtues of sympathy and advocacy that he so much wants us to admire. Such a task is not easy.
Both Hooker and Hale surely died without any sense of how much,
if at all, they had succeeded in achieving not just a community but a
community worthy of the name - a community for which it would
be worthwhile to strive. Probably the best you can say for this effort is that it is a battle that must be won over and over.
As White must have noticed - he is far too observant not to
have - Butskellism is not faring so well these days on either side of
the Atlantic. Yahoo populists, the Flem Snopeses of the world, find
themselves in joyous alliance with old aristocrats everywhere as
they undertake to dismantle the fuzzy bequest of centrism. Margaret Thatcher has her Alan Clark 47 and Newt Gingrich may profit
by her example - and will profit as long as he has native aristo46. IzAAK WALTON, THE Lu OF MR. RIc-ARD HOOKER (London 1665).
47. See ALAN CLARK, MRS. THATCHER'S MINISTER (1993). Clark's case has particular

dramatic impact because he is the son of the late Kenneth Clark, the poster boy for the
Masterpiece Theatre generation. In his dedication, the young Clark seeks to aestheticize the
new gaucherie: "For my beloved Jane, around whose cool and affectionate personality there
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crats like William F. Buckley and card-carrying bluebloods like William Weld. Graduates of Groton and Amherst gleefully grace the
pages of the American Spectator or the National Review. And
what of White?
Once again, the British experience may be relevant: they seem
to be about a half cycle ahead of us in these matters. At any rate, if
there is a single intellectual figurehead for modem British conservatism, it is surely Michael Oakeshott. At first blush, Oakeshott
seems to burgeon with precisely the sorts of virtues that White
would admire: culture, civility, and a rich sense of the infinite nuance of human relations. Indeed, in terms of general world view,
there is probably no one person who reminds me so much of White
as Oakeshott's star pupil, Shirley Letwin - Chicago-trained, emigrant to Britain, the author of The Gentleman in Trollope, the quintessential study of its kind.48 Yet Letwin is most likely to be
remembered not for her "gentlemanly" behavior but for her brilliant, exhaustive, and thoroughly partisan defense of the new age,
The Anatomy of Thatcherism.49 Old Butskell must be spinning in
his grave.
Does White care about this sea change in tastes and aspirations?
Does he notice? A person who engages Crito as a living presence is
one inclined to take the long view. He may assume that this, too,
shall pass. Otherwise, he may assume that the best thing he can do
in such troubled times is the same thing he would do in any other
time: to insist on being a gentleman in his own way, curiously
quaint, not precisely ridiculous, redeemed by his capacity to keep
the faith. In the words of his beloved Hooker:
Though for no other cause, yet for this; that posteritie may know we
have not loosely through silence permitted things to passe away as In
a dreame, there shall be for mens information extant thus much concerning the present state of the Church of God established amongst
us, and their carefull endevour which woulde have upheld the same.

[p. 94]

raged this maelstrom of egocentricity and self-indulgence." One suspects that the unkindest
thing you could say to Clark is that he really is not as bad as all that.
48. Sm.muy R. Lnrwn., GEenTLmAN IN TROLLOPE (1982).
49. Smnuy R. LErwiN, THm ANATOmy OF THATcHEmsim (1992). An aside: Someone

needs to explore the significance of the parent-son combinations in the new conservatism on
both sides of the Atlantic. In America, we have Gertrude Hillefarb, Irving Kristol, and their
son, William Kristol. We also have Norman Podhoretz, Midge Decter, and their son, John
Podhoretz. The British have William and Shirley Letwin and their son, Oliver - but then,
his main public achievement so far has been to lose a race for Parliament to Glenda Jackson.

